We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (HMS). We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to compare the HMS approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini. We show that the differences between the HMS approach and the others are mainly due to the notion of validity used and the fact that the HMS is based on a 3-valued propositional logic.
Introduction
Reasoning about knowledge has played a significant role in work in philosophy, economics, and distributed computing. Most of that work has used standard Kripke structures to model knowledge, where an agent knows a fact ϕ if ϕ is true in all the worlds that the agent considers possible. While this approach has proved useful for many applications, it suffers from a serious shortcoming, known as the logical omniscience problem (first observed and named by Hintikka [1962] ): agents know all tautologies and know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. This seems inappropriate for resource-bounded agents and agents who are unaware of various concepts (and thus do not know logical tautologies involving those concepts). To take just one simple example, a novice investor may not be aware of the notion of the price-earnings ratio, although that may be relevant to the decision of buying a stock.
There has been a great deal of work on the logical omniscience problem (see [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for an overview). Of most relevance to this paper are approaches that have focused on (lack of) awareness. Fagin and Halpern [1988] (FH from now on) were the first to deal with lack of model omniscience explicitly in terms of awareness. They did so by introducing an explicit awareness operator. Since then, there has been a stream of papers on the topic in the economics literature (see, for example, [Modica and Rustichini 1994; Modica and Rustichini 1999; Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998] ). In these papers, awareness is defined in terms of knowledge: an agent is aware of p if he either knows p or knows that he does not know p. All of them focused on the single-agent case. Recently, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [2003] (HMS from now on) have provided a multi-agent model for unawareness. In this paper, we consider how the HMS model compares to other work.
A key feature of the HMS approach (also present in the work of Modica and Rustichini [1999] -MR from now on) is that with each world or state is associated a (propositional) language. Intuitively, this is the language of concepts defined at that world. Agents may not be aware of all these concepts. The way that is modeled is that in all the states an agent considers possible at a state s, fewer concepts may be defined than are defined at state s. Because a proposition p may be undefined at a given state s, the underlying logic in HMS is best viewed as a 3-valued logic: a proposition p may be true, false, or undefined at a given state.
We consider two sound and complete axiomatizations for the HMS model, that differ with respect to the language used and the notion of validity. One axiomatization captures weak validity: a formula is weakly valid if it is never false (although it may be undefined). In the single-agent case, this axiomatization is identical to that given by MR. However, in the MR model, validity is taken with respect to "objective" state, where all formulas are defined. As shown by Halpern [2001] , this axiomatization is also sound and complete in the single-agent case with respect to a special case of FH's awareness structures; we extend Halpern's result to the multi-agent case. The other axiomatization of the HMS model captures (strong) validity: a formula is (strongly) valid if it is always true. If we add an axiom saying that there is no third value to this axiom system, then we just get the standard axiom system for S5. This shows that, when it comes to strong validity, the only difference between the HMS models and standard epistemic models is the third truth value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic S5 model, the FH model, the MR model, and the HMS model. In Section 3, we compare the HMS approach and the FH approach, both semantically and axiomatically, much as Halpern [2001] compares the MR and FH approaches. We show that weak validity in HMS structures corresponds in a precise sense to validity in awareness structures. In Section 4, we extend the HMS language by adding a nonstandard implication operator. Doing so allows us to provide an axiomatization for strong validity. We conclude in Section 5. Further discussion of the original HMS framework and an axiomatization of strong validity in the purely propositional case can be found in the appendix.
Background
We briefly review the standard epistemic logic and the approaches of FH, MR, and HMS here.
Standard epistemic logic
The syntax of standard epistemic logic is straightforward. Given a set {1, . . . , n} of agents, formulas are formed by starting with a set Φ = {p, q, . . .} of primitive propositions as well as a special formula ⊤ (which is always true), and then closing off under conjunction (∧), negation (¬) and the modal operators K i , i = 1, . . . , n. Call the resulting language L K n (Φ). 1 As usual, we define ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ⇒ ψ as abbreviations of ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, respectively.
The standard approach to giving semantics to L K n (Φ) uses Kripke structures. A Kripke structure for n agents (over Φ) is a tuple M = (Σ, π, K 1 , . . . , K n ), where Σ is a set of states, π : Σ × Φ → {0, 1} is an interpretation, which associates with each primitive propositions its truth value at each state in Σ, K i : Σ → 2 Σ is a possibility correspondence for agent i. Intuitively, if t ∈ K i (s), then agent i considers state t possible at state s. K i is reflexive if for all s ∈ Σ, s ∈ K i (s); it is transitive if for all s, t ∈ Σ, if t ∈ K i (s) then K i (t) ⊆ K i (s); it is Euclidean if for all s, t ∈ Σ, if t ∈ K i (s) then K i (t) ⊇ K i (s). 2 A Kripke structure is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; partitional) if the possibility correspondences K i are reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; reflexive, Euclidean, and transitive). Let M n (Φ) denote the class of all Kripke structures for n agents over Φ, with no restrictions on the K i relations. We use the superscripts r, e, and t to indicate that the K i relations are restricted to being reflexive, Euclidean, 1 In MR, only the single-agent case is considered. We consider the multi-agent here to allow the generalization to HMS. In many cases, ⊤ is defined in terms of other formulas, e.g., as ¬(p ∧ ¬p). We take it to be primitive here for convenience.
2 It is more standard in the philosophy literature to take Ki to be a binary relation. The two approaches are equivalent, since if K ′ i is a binary relation, we can define a possibility correspondence Ki by taking t ∈ Ki(s) iff (s, t) ∈ K ′ i . We can similarly define a binary relation given a possibility correspondence. Given this equivalence, it is easy to see that the notions of a possibility correspondence being reflexive, transitive, or Euclidean are equivalent to the corresponding notion for binary relations. and transitive, respectively. Thus, for example, M rt n (Φ) is the class of all reflexive and transitive Kripke structures for n agents.
We write (M, s) |= ϕ if ϕ is true at state s in the Kripke structure M . The truth relation is defined inductively as follows:
The FH model
The Logic of General Awareness model of Fagin and Halpern [1988] introduces a syntactic notion of awareness. This is reflected in the language by adding a new modal operator A i for each agent i. The intended interpretation of A i ϕ is "i is aware of ϕ". The power of this approach comes from the flexibility of the notion of awareness. For example, "agent i is aware of ϕ" may be interpreted as "agent i is familiar with all primitive propositions in ϕ" or as "agent i can compute the truth value of ϕ in time t". Having awareness in the language allows us to distinguish two notions of knowledge: implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Implicit knowledge, denoted with K i , is defined as truth in all worlds the agent considers possible, as usual. Explicit knowledge, denoted with X i , is defined as the conjunction of implicit knowledge and awareness. Let L K,X,A n (Φ) be the language extending L K n (Φ) by closing off under the operators A i and
(Φ) where the formulas do not mention K 1 , . . . , K n (resp., K 1 , . . . , K n and A 1 , . . . A n ).
An awareness structure for n agents over Φ is a tuple M = (Σ, π, K 1 , ..., K n , A 1 , ..., A n ), where (Σ, π, K 1 , ..., K n ) is a Kripke structure and A i is a function associating a set of formulas for each state, for i = 1, ..., n. Intuitively, A i (s) is the set of formulas that agent i is aware of at state s. The set of formulas the agent is aware of can be arbitrary. Depending on the interpretation of awareness one has in mind, certain restrictions on A i may apply. There are two restrictions that are of particular interest here:
• Awareness is generated by primitive propositions if, for all agents i, ϕ ∈ A i (s) iff all the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ are in A i (s) ∩ Φ. That is, an agent is aware of ϕ iff she is aware of all the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ.
• Agents know what they are aware of if, for all agents i, t
Following Halpern [2001] , we say that awareness structure is propositionally determined if awareness is generated by primitive propositions and agents know what they are aware of. The semantics for awareness structures extends the semantics defined for standard Kripke structures by adding two clauses defining A i and X i :
FH provide a complete axiomatization for the logic of awareness; we omit the details here.
The MR model
We follow Halpern's [2001] presentation of MR here; it is easily seen to be equivalent to that in [Modica and Rustichini 1999] .
Since MR consider only the single-case, they use the language L K 1 (Φ). A generalized standard model (GSM) over Φ has the form M = (S, Σ, π, K, ρ), where
• S and Σ are disjoint sets of states; moreover, Σ = ∪ Ψ⊆Φ S Ψ , where the sets S Ψ are disjoint. Intuitively, the states in S describe the objective situation, while the states in Σ describe the agent's subjective view of the objective situation, limited to the vocabulary that the agent is aware of.
• π : S × Φ ⇒ {0, 1} is an interpretation.
• K : S → 2 Σ is a generalized possibility correspondence.
• ρ is a projection from S to Σ such that (1) if ρ(s) = ρ(t) ∈ S Ψ then (a) s and t agree on the truth values of all primitive propositions in Ψ, that is, π(s, p) = π(t, p) for all p ∈ Ψ and (b) K(s) = K(t) and (2) if ρ(s) ∈ S Ψ , then K(s) ⊆ S Ψ . Intuitively, ρ(s) is the agent's subjective state in objective state s.
We can extend K to a map (also denoted K for convenience) defined on S ∪ Σ in the following way: if s ′ ∈ Σ and ρ(s) = s ′ , define K(s ′ ) = K(s). Condition 1(b) on ρ guarantees that this extension is well defined. A GSM is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; partitional) if K restricted to Σ is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; reflexive, Euclidean and transitive). Similarly, we can extend π to a function (also denoted π) defined on S ∪ Σ: if s ′ ∈ S Ψ , p ∈ Ψ and ρ(s) = s ′ , define π(s ′ , p) = π(s, p); and if s ′ ∈ S Ψ and p / ∈ Ψ, define π(s ′ , p) = 1/2. With these extensions of K and π, the semantics for formulas in GSMs is identical to that in standard Kripke structures except for the negation, which is defined as follows:
Note that for states in the "objective" state space S, the logic is 2-valued; and every formula is either true or false. On the other hand, for states in the "subjective" state space Σ the logic is 3-valued. A formula may be neither true nor false. It is easy to check that if s ∈ S Ψ , then every formula in L K 1 (Ψ) is either true or false at s, while formulas not in L K 1 (Ψ) are neither true nor false. Intuitively, an agent can assign truth values only to formulas involving concepts he is aware of; at states in S Ψ , the agent is aware only of concepts expressed in the language L K 1 (Ψ). The intuition behind MR's notion of awareness is that an agent is unaware of ϕ if he does not know ϕ, does not know he does not know it, and so on. Thus, an agent is aware of ϕ if he either knows ϕ or knows he does not know ϕ, or knows that he does not know that he does not know ϕ, or . . . . MR show that under appropriate assumptions, this infinite disjunction is equivalent to the first two disjuncts, so they define Aϕ to be an abbreviation of Kϕ ∨ K¬Kϕ.
Rather than considering validity, MR consider what we call here objective validity: truth in all objective states (that is, the states in S). Note that all classical (2-valued) propositional tautologies are objectively valid in the MR setting. MR provide a system U that is a sound and complete axiomatization for objective validity with respect to partitional GSM structures. The system U consists of the axioms Prop, T, and 4, the inference rule MP, and the following additional axioms and inference rules:
RE sa . From ϕ ⇔ ψ infer Kϕ ⇔ Kψ, where ϕ and ψ contain exactly the same primitive propositions. [Modica and Rustichini 1999] U is a complete and sound axiomatization of objective validity for the language L K 1 (Φ) with respect to partitional GSMs over Φ.
Theorem 2.2:

The HMS model
HMS define their approach semantically, without giving a logic. We discuss their semantic approach in the appendix. To facilitate comparison of HMS to the other approaches we have considered, we define an appropriate logic. (In recent work done independently of ours [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2005] , HMS also consider a logic based on their approach, whose syntax and semantics is essentially identical to that described here.) Given a set Φ of primitive propositions, consider again the language L K n (Φ). An HMS structure for n agents (over Φ) is a tuple M = (Σ, K 1 , . . . , K n , π, {ρ Ψ ′ ,Ψ : Ψ ⊆ Ψ ′ ⊆ Φ}), where (as in MR), Σ = ∪ Ψ⊆Φ S Ψ is a set of states, π : Σ × Φ → {0, 1, 1/2} is an interpretation such that for s ∈ S Ψ , π(s, p) = 1/2 iff p ∈ Ψ (intuitively, all primitive propositions in Ψ are defined at states of S Ψ ), and 
Finally, the |= relation in HMS structures is defined for formulas in L K n (Φ) in exactly the same way as it is in subjective states of MR structures. Moreover, like MR, A i ϕ is defined as an abbreviation of
Note that the definition of |= does not use the functions ρ Ψ,Ψ ′ . These functions are used only to impose some coherence conditions on HMS structures. To describe these conditions, we need a definition. Given
. Thus, we can think of B ↑ as the states in which B can be expressed.
Projections preserve knowledge: If
Ψ 1 ⊆ Ψ 2 ⊆ Ψ 3 , s ∈ S Ψ 3 , and K i (s) ⊆ S Ψ 2 , then ρ Ψ 2 ,Ψ 1 (K i (s)) = K i (ρ Ψ 3 ,Ψ 1 (s)).
Projections preserve ignorance: If
We remark that HMS combined parts (a) and (b) of stationarity into one statement (saying K i (s) = K i (s ′ )). We split the condition in this way to make it easier to capture axiomatically. Roughly speaking, generalized reflexivity, part (a) of stationarity, and part (b) of stationarity are analogues of the assumptions in standard epistemic structures that the possibility correspondences are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean, respectively. The remaining assumptions can be viewed as coherence conditions. See [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2003] for further discussion of these conditions. If C is a subset of {r, t, e}, let H C n (Φ) denote the class of HMS structures over Φ satisfying confinedness, projections preserve knowledge, projections preserve ignorance, and the subset of generalized reflexivity, part (a) of stationarity, and part (b) of stationarity corresponding to C. Thus, for example, H rt n (Φ) is the class of HMS structures for n agents over Φ that satisfy confinedness, projections preserve knowledge, projections preserve ignorance, generalized reflexivity, and part (a) of stationarity. HMS consider only "partitional" HMS structures, that is, structures in H rte n (Φ). However, we can get more insight into HMS structures by allowing the greater generality of considering non-partitional structures.
A Comparison of the Approaches
As a first step to comparing the MR, HMS, and FH approaches, we recall a result proved by Halpern.
Lemma 3.1: [Halpern 2001 
Halpern proves this lemma only for the single-agent case, but the proof goes through without change for the multi-agent case. Note that this equivalence does not hold in general in non-partitional structures.
Thus, if we restrict to partitional awareness structures where awareness is generated by primitive propositions, we can define awareness just as MR and HMS do.
Halpern [2001, Theorem 4 .1] proves an even stronger connection between the semantics of FH and MR, essentially showing that partitional GSMs are in a sense equivalent to propositionally determined awareness structures. We prove a generalization of this result here.
If C is a subset of {r, t, e}, let N C,pd n (Φ) and N C,pg n denote the set of propositionally determined awareness structures over Φ and the set of awareness structures over Φ where awareness is propositionally generated, respectively, whose
n (Φ) be the formula that results by replacing all occurrences of K i in ϕ by X i . Finally, let Φ ϕ be the set of primitive propositions appearing in ϕ.
Theorem 3.2:
Let C be a subset of {r, t, e}.
It follows immediately from Halpern's analogue of Theorem 3.2 that ϕ is objectively valid in GSMs iff ϕ X is valid in propositionally determined partitional awareness structures. Thus, objective validity in GSMs and validity in propositionally determined partitional awareness structures are characterized by the same set of axioms.
We would like to get a similar result here. However, if we define validity in the usual way-that is, ϕ is valid iff (M, s) |= ϕ for all states s and all HMS structures M -then it is easy to see that there are no (non-trivial) valid HMS formulas. Since the HMS logic is three-valued, besides what we will call strong validity (truth in all states), we can consider another standard notion of validity. A formula is weakly valid iff it is not false at any state in any HMS structure (that is, it is either true or undefined at every state in every HMS structure). Put another way, ϕ is weakly valid if, at all states where ϕ is defined, ϕ is true.
Halpern [2001] provides a sound and complete axiomatizations for the language L X,A 1 (Φ) with respect to N C,pd (Φ), where C is either ∅, {r}, {r, t} and {r, e, t}. It is straightforward to extend his techniques to other subsets of {r, e, t} and to arbitrary numbers of agents. However, these axioms involve combinations of X i and A i ; for example, all the systems have an axiom of the form Xϕ∧ X(ϕ ⇒ ψ)∧ Aψ ⇒ Xψ. There seems to be no obvious axiomatization for L X n (Φ) that just involves axioms in the language L X n (Φ) except for the special case of partitional awareness structures, where A i is definable in terms of X i (see Lemma 3.1), although this may simply be due to the fact that there are no interesting axioms for this language.
Let S5 X n be the n-agent version of the axiom system S5 X that Halpern proves is sound and complete for L X n (Φ) with respect to N ret,pd n (Φ) (so that, for example, the axiom Xϕ∧ X(ϕ ⇒ ψ)∧ Aψ ⇒ Xψ becomes
n be the result of replacing all occurrences of X i in formulas in S5 X n by K i . Similarly, let U n be the n-agent version of the axiom system U together with the axiom A i K j ϕ ⇔ A i ϕ, 4 and let U X n be the result of replacing all instances of K i in the axioms of U n by X i . HMS have shown that there is a sense in which a variant of U n (which is easily seen to be equivalent to U n ) is a sound and complete axiomatization for HMS structures [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2005] . Although this is not the way they present it, their results actually show that U n is a sound and complete axiomatization of weak validity with respect to H ret n (Φ). Thus, the following is immediate from Corollary 3.3.
Corollary 3.4: U n and S5 K n are both sound and complete axiomatization of weak validity for the language L K n (Φ) with respect to H ret n (Φ); U X n and S5 X n are both sound and complete axiomatizations of validity for the language L X n (Φ) with respect to N ret,pd n (Φ).
We can provide a direct proof that U n and S5 K n (resp., U X n and S5 X n ) are equivalent, without appealing to Corollary 3.3. It is easy to check that all the axioms of U X n are valid in N ret,pd n (Φ) and all the inference rules of U X n preserve validity. From the completeness of S5 X n proved by Halpern, it follows that anything provable in U X n is provable in S5 X n , and hence that anything provable in U n is provable in S5 K n . Similarly, it is easy to check that all the axioms of S5 K n are weakly valid in H ret n (Φ), and the inference rules preserve validity. Thus, from the results of HMS, it follows that everything provable in S5 K n is provable in U n (and hence that everything provable in S5 X n is provable in U X n ). These results show a tight connection between the various approaches. U is a sound and complete axiomatization for objective validity in partitional GSMs; U n is a sound and complete axiomatization for weak validity in partitional HMS structures; and U X n is a sound and complete axiomatization for (the standard notion of) validity in partitional awareness structures where awareness is generated by primitive propositions and agents know which formulas they are aware of.
Strong Validity
We say a formula is (strongly) valid in HMS structures if it is true at every state in every HMS structure. We can get further insight into HMS structures by considering strong validity. However, since no nontrivial formulas in L K n (Φ) are valid in HMS structures, we must first extend the language. We do so by adding a nonstandard implication operator ֒→ to the language. 5 Given an HMS structure M , define
M is the set of states in M where ϕ is true. Roughly speaking, we want to define ֒→ in such a way that if
The one time when we do not necessarily want this is if ϕ M = ∅. For example, we definitely do not want r ∨ (p ∧ ¬p) ֒→ r ∨ (q ∧ ¬q) to be valid (since r ∨ (p ∧ ¬p) will be true at a state where r is true, p is defined, and q is undefined, while r ∧ (q ∧ ¬q) is undefined at such a state). Thus, it seems unreasonable to have p ∧ ¬p ֒→ q ∧ ¬q be valid, even though
we take ϕ ֒→ ψ to be valid only if ψ is at least as defined as ϕ. Since the set of states where
n (Φ) be the language that results by closing off under ֒→ in addition to ¬, ∧, and K 1 , . . . , K n ; let L ֒→ (Φ) be the propositional fragment of the language. We cannot use the MR definition of negation for L K,֒→ n (Φ), since ϕ ֒→ ψ may be defined even in states where ϕ and ψ are not defined. (For example, p ֒→ p is true in all states, even in states where p is not defined.) Thus, we must separately define the truth and falsity of all formulas at all states, which we do as follows. In the definitions, we use (M, s) |=↑ϕ as an abbreviation of (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ¬ϕ; and (M, s) |=↓ϕ as an abbreviation of (M, s) |= ϕ or (M, s) |= ¬ϕ (so (M, s) |=↑ϕ iff ϕ is neither true nor false at s, i.e., it is undefined at s).
It is easy to check that this semantics agrees with the MR semantics for formulas in L K n (Φ). Moreover, the following lemma follows by an easy induction on the structure of formulas.
It is useful to define the following abbreviations:
• ϕ ⇀ ↽ ψ is an abbreviation of (ϕ ֒→ ψ) ∧ (ψ ֒→ ϕ);
• ϕ = 1 is an abbreviation of ¬(ϕ ֒→ ¬⊤);
• ϕ = 0 is an abbreviation of ¬(¬ϕ ֒→ ¬⊤);
• ϕ = 1 2 is an abbreviation of (ϕ ֒→ ¬⊤) ∧ (¬ϕ ֒→ ¬⊤).
Using the formulas ϕ = 0, ϕ = 1 2 , and ϕ = 1, we can reason directly about the truth value of formulas. This will be useful in our axiomatization.
In our axiomatization of L K,֒→ n (Φ) with respect to HMS structures, just as in standard epistemic logic, we focus on axioms that characterize properties of the K i relation that correspond to reflexivity, transitivity, and the Euclidean property.
Consider the following axioms:
Prop ′ . All substitution instances of formulas valid in L ֒→ (Φ).
Conf2.
MP ′ . From ϕ and ϕ ֒→ ψ infer ψ.
A few comments regarding the axioms: Prop ′ , K ′ , T ′ , 4 ′ , 5 ′ , and MP ′ are weakenings of the corresponding axioms and inference rule for standard epistemic logic. All of them use ֒→ rather than ⇒; in some cases further weakening is required. We provide an axiomatic characterization of Prop ′ in the appendix. A key property of the axiomatization is that if we just add the axiom ϕ = 1/2 (saying that all formulas are defined), we get a complete axiomatization of classical logic. T (with ⇒ replaced by ֒→) is sound in HMS systems satisfying generalized reflexivity for formulas ϕ in L K n (Φ). But, for example, K i (p = 1/2) ֒→ p = 1/2 is not valid; p may be defined (i.e., be either true or false) at a state s and undefined at all states s ′ ∈ K i (s). Note that axiom 5 is equivalent to its contrapositive ¬K i ¬K i ϕ ⇒ K i ϕ. This is not sound in its full strength; for example, if p is defined at s but undefined at the states in K i (s), then (M, s) |= ¬K i ¬K i p ∧ ¬K i p. Axioms Conf1 and Conf2, as the names suggest, capture confinedness. We can actually break confinedness into two parts. If s ∈ S Ψ , the first part says that each state s ′ ∈ K i (s) is in some set S Ψ ′ such that Ψ ′ ⊆ Ψ. In particular, that means that a formula in L K n (Φ) that is undefined at s must be undefined at each state in K i (s). This is just what Conf1 says. Note that Conf1 does not hold for arbitrary formulas; for example, if p is defined and q is undefined at s, and both are undefined at all states
The second part of confinedness says that all states in K i (s) are in the same set S Ψ ′ . This is captured by Conf2, since it says that if ϕ is defined at some state in K i (s), then it is defined at all states in K i (s). B1 and B2 are technical axioms that capture the semantics of K i ϕ. 6 Let AX K,֒→ n be the system consisting of Prop ′ , K ′ , B1, B2, Conf1, Conf2, MP ′ , and Gen. Theorem 4.2 also allows us to relate HMS structures to standard epistemic structures. It is easy to check that if C is a (possibly empty) subset of {T ′ , 4 ′ , 5 ′ } and C is the corresponding subset of {r, e, t}, all the axioms of AX K,֒→ n ∪ C are sound with respect to standard epistemic structures M C n (Φ). Moreover, we get completeness by adding the axiom ϕ = 1/2, which says that all formulas are either true or false. Thus, in a precise sense, HMS differs from standard epistemic logic by allowing a third truth value.
Conclusion
We have compared the HMS approach and the FH approach to modeling unawareness. Our results show that, as long as we restrict to the language L K n (Φ), the approaches are essentially equivalent; we can translate from one to the other. We are currently investigating extending the logic of awareness by allowing awareness of unawareness [Halpern and Rêgo ] , so that it would be possible to say, for example, that there exists a fact that agent 1 is unaware of but agent 1 knows that agent 2 is aware of it. This would be expressed by the formula ∃p(¬A 1 p ∧ X 1 A 2 p). Such reasoning seems critical to capture what is going on in a number of games. Moreover, it is not clear whether it can be expressed in the HMS framework. 
A The Original HMS Approach
HMS describe their approach purely semantically, without giving a logic. We review their approach here (making some inessential changes for ease of exposition). An HMS frame for n agents is a tuple (Σ, K 1 , . . . , K n , (∆, ), {ρ β,α : α, β ∈ ∆, α β}), where:
• ∆ is an arbitrary lattice, partially ordered by ;
• K 1 , . . . , K n are possibility correspondences, one for each agent;
• Σ is a disjoint union of the form ∪ α∈∆ S α ;
In the logic-based version of HMS given in Section 2.4, ∆ consists of the subsets of Φ, and Ψ Ψ ′ iff Ψ ⊆ Ψ ′ . Thus, the original HMS definition can be viewed as a more abstract version of that given in Section 2.4.
. We can think of B ↑ as the states in which B can be expressed. HMS focus on sets of the form B ↑ , which they take to be events.
HMS assume that their frames satisfy the five conditions mentioned in Section 2.4, restated in their more abstract setting. The statements of generalized reflexivity and stationarity remain the same. Confinedness, projections preserve knowledge, and projections preserve ignorance are stated as follows:
• confinedness: if s ∈ S β then K i (s) ⊆ S α for some α β;
• projections preserve knowledge: if α β γ, s ∈ S γ , and
• projections preserve ignorance: if s ∈ S β and α β then
HMS start by considering the algebra consisting of all events of the form B ↑ . In this algebra, they define an operator ¬ by taking
∈ {∅, S α }. However, it remains to define ¬∅ ↑ . We could just take it to be Σ, but then we have ¬¬S ↑ α = Σ, rather than ¬¬S ↑ α = S ↑ α . To avoid this problem, in their words, HMS "devise a distinct vacuous event ∅ Sα " for each subspace S α , extend the algebra with these events, and define ¬S ↑ α = ∅ Sα and ¬∅ Sα = S ↑ α . They do not make clear exactly what it means to "devise a vacuous event". We can recast their definitions in the following way, that allows us to bring in the events ∅ Sα more naturally.
In a 2-valued logic, given a formula ϕ and a structure M , the set [[ϕ]] M of states where ϕ is true and the set [[¬ϕ] ] M of states where ϕ is false are complements of each other, so it suffices to associate with ϕ only one set, say [[ϕ] ] M . In a 3-valued logic, the set of states where ϕ is true does not determine the set of states where ϕ is false. Rather, we must consider three mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets: the set where ϕ is true, the set where ϕ is false, and the set where ϕ is undefined. As before, one of these is redundant, since it is the complement of the union of the other two. Note that if ϕ is a formula in the language of HMS, the set HMS use intersection of events to represent conjunction. It is not hard to see that the intersection of events is itself an event. The obvious way to represent disjunction is as the union of events, but the union of events is in general not an event. Thus, HMS define a disjunction operator using de Morgan's law: E ∨ E ′ = ¬(¬E ∩ ¬E ′ ). In our setting, where we use pairs of sets, we can also define operators ∼ and ⊓ (intuitively, for negation and intersection) by taking ∼ (E, E ′ ) = (E ′ , E) and
Although our definition of ⊓ may not seem so intuitive, as the next result shows,
. Moreover, our definition has the advantage of not using ¬, so it applies even if E and F are not events.
We first show that I = S ↑ γ , where γ = sup(α, β). By assumption, E = B ↑ for some B ⊆ S α , and F = C ↑ for some C ⊆ S β . Suppose that s ∈ I. We claim that s ∈ S δ , where α δ and β δ. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that α δ. Then s / ∈ E ∪ E ′ , so s / ∈ I, a contradiction. A similar argument shows that β δ. Thus γ δ and s ∈ S ↑ γ . For the opposite inclusion, suppose that s ∈ S ↑ γ . Since α γ and β γ, the projections ρ γ,α (s) and ρ γ,β (s) are well defined. Let X = E if ρ γ,α (s) ∈ B and X = E ′ otherwise. Similarly, let Y = F if ρ γ,β (s) ∈ C and Y = F ′ otherwise. It is easy to see that s ∈ (X ∩ Y ) ⊆ I. It follows that
The result now follows easily.
Finally, HMS define an operator K i corresponding to the possibility correspondence K i . They define K i (E) = {s : K i (s) ⊆ E}, 9 and show that K i (E) is an event if E is. In our setting, we define
Essentially, we are defining
Intersecting with E ∪ E ′ is unnecessary in the HMS framework, since their conditions on frames guarantee that
The definitions above guarantee that K i ϕ is defined on the same set. HMS define an awareness operator in the spirit of MR, by taking A i (E) to be an abbreviation of K i (E)∨ K i ¬K i (E). They then prove a number of properties of knowledge and awareness, such as
The semantics we have given for our logic matches that of the operators defined by HMS, in the sense of the following lemma.
7 In a more recent version of their paper, HMS identify a nonempty event E with the pair (E, S), where, for E = B ↑ , S is the unique set Sα containing B. Then ∅ S can be identified with (∅, S). While we also identify events with pairs of sets and ∅ S with (∅, S), our identification is different from that of HMS, and extends more naturally to sets that are not events.
8 Note that sup(α, β) is well defined since ∆ is a lattice. 9 Actually, this is their definition only if {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E} = ∅; otherwise, they take Ki(E) = ∅ Sα if E = B ↑ for some B ⊆ Sα. We do not need a special definition if {s : Ki(s) ⊆ E} = ∅ using our approach.
Lemma A.2: For all formulas
Proof: Part (a) follows easily from the fact that
For part (b), note that
Now the result is immediate from the observation that
For (c), by definition of K i , 
B An Axiomatization of L ֒→ (Φ)
Note that the formulas ϕ = 0, ϕ = 1 2 , and ϕ = 1 are 2-valued. More generally, we define a formula ϕ to be 2-valued if (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1) is valid in all HMS structures. Because they obey the usual axioms of classical logic, 2-valued formulas play a key role in our axiomatization of L ֒→ (Φ). We say that a formula is definitely 2-valued if it is in the smallest set containing ⊤ and all formulas of the form ϕ = k which is closed under negation, conjunction, nonstandard implication, and K i , so that if ϕ and ψ are definitely two-valued, then so are ¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ, ϕ ′ ֒→ ψ (for all ϕ ′ ), and K i ϕ. Let D 2 denote the set of definitely 2-valued formulas.
The following lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma B.1: If ϕ is definitely 2-valued, then it is 2-valued.
Let AX 3 consist of the following collection of axioms and inference rules:
, for i, j ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} and i = j.
R1. From ϕ = 1 infer ϕ.
It is well known that P0-P4 together with MP ′ provide a complete axiomatization for classical 2-valued propositional logic with negation, conjunction, implication, and ⊤. 10 Axioms P5-P10 are basically a translation to formulas of the semantics for conjunction, negation and implication.
Note that all the axioms of AX 3 are sound in classical logic (all formulas of the form ϕ = 1/2 are vacuously false in classical logic). Moreover, it is easy to show that if we add the axiom ¬(ϕ = 1/2) to AX 3 , we get a sound and complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic (although many axioms then become redundant).
Theorem B.2: AX 3 is a sound and complete axiomatization of L ֒→ (Φ).
Proof: The proof that the axiomatization is sound is a straightforward induction on the length of the proof of any theorem ϕ. We omit the details here. For completeness, we need to show that a valid formula ϕ ∈ L ֒→ (Φ) is provable in AX 3 . We first prove that ϕ = 1 is provable in AX 3 using standard techniques, and then apply R1 to infer ϕ. We proceed as follows.
Given a set G of formulas, let ∧G = ϕ∈G ϕ. A set G of formulas is AX-consistent, if for all finite subsets G ′ ⊆ G, AX ⊢ ¬(∧G ′ ). A set G of formulas is maximal AX-consistent if G is AX-consistent and for all ϕ / ∈ G, G ∪ {ϕ} is not AX-consistent.
Lemma B.3:
If G is an AX-consistent subset of G ′ , then G can be extended to a maximal AX-consistent subset of G ′ .
Proof:
The proof uses standard techniques. Let ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . be an enumeration of the formulas in G ′ . Define
We claim that F is an maximal AX-consistent subset of G ′ . Suppose that ψ ∈ G ′ and ψ / ∈ F. By construction, we have ψ = ψ k for some k. If F k−1 ∪ {ψ k } were AX-consistent, then ψ k would be in F k and hence ψ k would be in F. Since ψ k = ψ / ∈ F, we have that F k−1 ∪ {ψ} is not AX-consistent and hence F ∪ {ψ}, is not AX-consistent.
The next lemma shows that maximal AX 3 -consistent sets of definitely 2-valued formulas satisfy essentially the same properties as maximal classically consistent sets of formulas.
Lemma B.4:
Let AX be any axiom system that includes AX 3 . For all maximal AX-consistent subsets F of D 2 , the following properties hold:
(1) for every formula ϕ ∈ D 2 , exactly one of ϕ and ¬ϕ is in F; 10 We remark that we included formulas of the form Kiϕ among the formulas that are definitely 2-valued. While such formulas are not relevant in the axiomatization of L ֒→ (Φ), they do play a role when we consider the axiom Prop ′ in AX K,֒→ n , which applies to instances in the language L
(2) for every formula ϕ ∈ L ֒→ (Φ), exactly one of ϕ = 0, ϕ = 1/2, and ϕ = 1 is in F;
(4) (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 ∈ F iff ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 1 ∈ F;
(5) (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0 ∈ F iff either ϕ = 0 ∈ F and ψ = 1/2 / ∈ F, or ψ = 0 ∈ F and ϕ = 1/2 / ∈ F;
(6) ψ = 1 ∈ F iff (¬ψ) = 0 ∈ F;
(8) (ϕ ֒→ ψ) = 1 ∈ F iff either ϕ = 0 ∈ F and ψ = 1/2 / ∈ F; or ϕ = 1/2 ∈ F; or ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 1 ∈ F; (9) (ϕ ֒→ ψ) = 0 ∈ F iff ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 0 ∈ F; (10) if ϕ ∈ D 2 and AX ⊢ ϕ, then ϕ ∈ F; Proof: First, note that axioms P0-P4 and MP ′ guarantee that classical propositional reasoning can be used for formulas in D 2 . We thus use classical propositional reasoning with minimal comment.
For (1), we first show that exactly one of F ∪ {ϕ} and F ∪ {¬ϕ} is AX-consistent. Suppose that F ∪ {ϕ} and F ∪ {¬ϕ} are both AX-consistent. Then ϕ ∈ F and ¬ϕ ∈ F. Since ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ∈ D 2 , AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ), but this is a contradiction since F is AX-consistent. Now suppose that neither F ∪ {ϕ} nor F ∪ {¬ϕ} is AX-consistent. Then there exist finite subsets H 1 , H 2 ⊆ F such that AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ (∧H 1 )) and AX ⊢ ¬(¬ϕ∧(∧H 2 )). Let G = H 1 ∪H 2 . By classical propositional reasoning, AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ∧(∧G)) and
Hence, by MP ′ , AX ⊢ ¬(∧G). This is a contradiction, since G ⊆ F and F is AX-consistent.
Suppose that F ∪ {ϕ} is AX-consistent (the other case is completely analogous). Since F is a maximal AX-consistent subset of D 2 and ϕ ∈ D 2 , we have ϕ ∈ F. And since F ∪ {¬ϕ} is not AX-consistent, ¬ϕ / ∈ F. For (2), we first show that exactly one of F ∪ {ϕ = i}, for i = {0, 1/2, 1}, is AX-consistent. Suppose that F ∪ {ϕ = i} and F ∪ {ϕ = j}, i = j, are AX-consistent. Then ϕ = i ∈ F and ϕ = j ∈ F. By axiom P11, AX ⊢ ¬(ϕ = i ∧ ϕ = j). This is a contradiction, since F is AX-consistent.
Next, suppose that none of F ∪ {ϕ = i} is AX-consistent. Then there exist finite sets
). Now using axiom P11, we have AX ⊢ ¬(∧G). This is a contradiction, since G ⊆ F and F is AX-consistent.
Let i * be the unique i such that F ∪ {ϕ = i * } is AX-consistent. Since F is a maximal AX-consistent subset of D 2 and ϕ = i * ∈ D 2 , we have that {ϕ = i * } ∈ F. And since F is AX-consistent, it is clear by P11, that if j = i * , then {ϕ = j} / ∈ F. For (3), by part (1), if ψ / ∈ F, then ¬ψ ∈ F. Thus, {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k , ¬ψ} ⊆ F. But since
The proof of the remaining properties follows easily from parts (2) and (3). For example, for part (4), if (ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 ∈ F, then the fact that ϕ = 1 ∈ F and ψ = 1 ∈ F follows from P5 and (3). We leave details to the reader.
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable in a structure M if (M, s) |= ϕ for some world in M ; ϕ is satisfiable in a class of structures N if it is satisfiable in at least one structure in N . Let M P be the class of all 3-valued propositional HMS models.
Lemma B.5:
If ϕ = i is AX 3 -consistent, then ϕ = i is satisfiable in M P , for i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}.
Proof:
We construct a special model M c ∈ M P called the canonical 3-valued model. M c has a state s V corresponding to every V that is a maximal AX 3 -consistent subset of D 2 . We show that
Note that this claim suffices to prove Lemma B.5 since, by Lemma B.3, if ϕ = i is AX 3 -consistent, then it is contained in a maximal AX 3 -consistent subset of D 2 . We proceed as follows. Let M c = (Σ, π), where Σ = {s V : V is a maximal consistent subset of D 2 } and
Note that by Lemma B.4(2), the interpretation π is well defined.
We now show that the claim holds by induction on the structure of formulas. If ψ is a primitive proposition, this follows from the definition of π(s V , ψ).
Suppose that ψ = ¬ϕ. By Lemma B.4 (7), (¬ϕ) = 1 ∈ V iff ϕ = 0 ∈ V . By the induction hypothesis,
By the semantics of the logic, we have (M c , s V ) |= ϕ = 0 iff (M c , s V ) |= ¬ϕ, and the latter holds iff (M c , s V ) |= (¬ϕ) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(6), we can show (¬ϕ) = 0 ∈ V iff (M c , s V ) |= (¬ϕ) = 0. The remaining case ϕ = 1/2 follows from the previous cases, axiom P11, and the fact that (M c , s V ) |= ψ = i for exactly one i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. (For all the following steps of the induction the case ϕ = 1/2 is omitted since it follows from the other cases for exactly the same reason.)
Suppose that ψ = ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 . By Lemma B.4(4), ψ = 1 ∈ V iff ϕ 1 = 1 ∈ V and ϕ 2 = 1 ∈ V . By the induction hypothesis, ϕ j = 1 ∈ V iff (M c , s V ) |= ϕ j = 1 for j ∈ 1, 2, which is true iff (M c , s V ) |= (ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(5), we can show that
Suppose that ψ = ϕ 1 ֒→ ϕ 2 . By Lemma B.4(8), ψ = 1 ∈ V iff either ϕ 1 = 0 ∈ V and ϕ 2 = 1/2 / ∈ V ; or ϕ 1 = 1/2 ∈ V ; or ϕ 1 = 1 ∈ V and ϕ 2 = 1 ∈ V . By the induction hypothesis, this is true iff either
By the semantics of ֒→, this holds iff (M c , s V ) |= (ϕ ֒→ ψ) = 1. Similarly, using Lemma B.4(9), we can show that
We can finally complete the proof of Theorem B.2. Suppose that ϕ is valid. This implies (ϕ = 0)∨(ϕ = 1/2) is not satisfiable. By Lemma B.5, (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) is not AX 3 -consistent, so AX 3 ⊢ ¬((ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2)). By axioms P0-P4, P11 and MP ′ , AX 3 ⊢ ϕ = 1. And finally, applying R1, AX 3 ⊢ ϕ. So, the axiomatization is complete.
C Proofs of Theorems
In this section, we provide proofs of the theorems in Sections 3 and 4. We restate the results for the reader's convenience.
The next lemma, which is easily proved by induction on the structure of formulas, will be used throughout. We leave the proof to the reader.
Theorem 3.2: Let C be a subset of {r, t, e}.
. . , A n ) be an awareness structure such that
is the smallest set of formulas containing Ψ that is propositionally generated.
By construction, M ′ ∈ N C,pg n (Φ). It is easy to check that if C ∩ {t, e} = ∅, then agents know what they are aware of, so that M ′ ∈ N C,pd n (Φ). We complete the proof of part (a) by proving, by induction on the structure of ϕ, that if s ∈ S Ψ and Φ ϕ ⊆ Ψ, then (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M ′ , s) |= ϕ X . If ϕ is either a primitive proposition, or ϕ = ¬ψ, or ϕ = ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 , the result is obvious either from the definition of π ′ or from the induction hypothesis. We omit details here.
By the induction hypothesis, it follows that for all t ∈ K i (s), (M ′ , t) |= ψ. If K i satisfies generalized reflexivity, it easily follows from Lemma C.1 that (M, s) |= ψ so, by the induction hypothesis,
, it follows that ψ is defined at all states in K i (s). Thus, Φ ψ ⊆ Ψ, for otherwise a simple induction shows that ψ would be undefined at states in S Ψ . Hence, Φ ψ ⊆ A i (s). Since awareness is generated by primitive propositions, we have ψ ∈ A i (s), as desired. Now suppose that K i (s) = ∅ and s ∈ S Ψ . By assumption,
be an HMS structure such that
} is the set of primitive propositions that agent i is aware of at state s;
Note that since agents know what they are aware of, if t ∈ K i (s), then Ψ i (t) = Ψ i (s).
We first show that M ′ satisfies confinedness and that projections preserve knowledge and ignorance. Confinedness follows since K ′ i ((s, Ψ)) ⊆ S Ψ∩Ψ i (s) . To prove projections preserve knowledge, suppose that
Therefore, projections preserve knowledge.
To prove that projections preserve ignorance, note that
We now show by induction on the structure of ϕ that if
If ϕ is a primitive proposition, or ϕ = ¬ψ, or ϕ = ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 , the result is obvious either from the definition of π ′ or from the induction hypothesis. We omit details here.
By the induction hypothesis and the definition of s) , and therefore at all states in
Since awareness is generated by primitive propositions, ψ ∈ A i (s). Thus, (M, s) |= A i ψ, which implies that (M, s) |= X i ψ, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that (M, s) |= X i ψ and
Since agents know what they are aware of, if
If {t, e} ∩ C = ∅, then it is easy to check that the result holds even if M ∈ (N C,pg n (Φ) − N C,pd n (Φ)), since the property that agents know what they are aware of was only used to prove part (a) and part (b) of stationarity in the proof.
Corollary 3.3: If
Proof: For part (a), suppose that ϕ X is valid with respect to the class of awareness structures N C,pg n (Φ) where awareness is generated by primitive propositions and that ϕ is not weakly valid with respect to the class of HMS structures H C n (Φ). Then ¬ϕ is true at some state in some HMS structure in H C n (Φ). By part (a) of Theorem 3.2, ¬ϕ X is also true at some state in some awareness structure where awareness is generated by primitive propositions, a contradiction since ϕ X is valid in N C,pg n (Φ). For the converse, suppose that ϕ is weakly valid in H C n (Φ) and that ϕ X is not valid with respect to the class of awareness structures N C,pg n (Φ). Then ¬ϕ X is true at some state in some awareness structure in N C,pg n (Φ). By part (b) of Theorem 3.2, ¬ϕ is also true at some state in some HMS structure in H C n (Φ), a contradiction since ϕ is weakly valid in H C n (Φ). The proof of part (b) is the same except that N C,pg n (Φ) is replaced throughout by N C,pd n (Φ).
Theorem 4.2: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T ′ , 4 ′ , 5 ′ } and let C be the corresponding subset of {r, t, e}. Then AX K,֒→ n ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language L K,֒→ n (Φ) with respect to H C n (Φ). Proof: Soundness is straightforward, as usual, by induction on the length of the proof (after showing that all the axioms are sound and that the inference rules preserve strong validity). We leave details to the reader.
To prove completeness, we first define a simplified HMS structure for n agents to be a tuple M = (Σ, K 1 , . . . , K n , π). That is, a simplified HMS structure is an HMS structure without the projection functions. The definition of |= for simplified HMS structures is the same as that for HMS structures. (Recall that the projections functions are not needed for defining |=.) Let H − n (Φ) consist of all simplified HMS structures for n agents over Φ that satisfy confinedness. Proof: Again, soundness is obvious. For completeness, it clearly suffices to show that every AX K,֒→ n -consistent formula is satisfiable in some structure in H − n . As usual, we do this by constructing a canonical model M c ∈ H − n and showing that every AX K,֒→ n -consistent formula of the form ϕ = i for i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1} is satisfiable in some state of M c . Since (M c , s) |= ϕ iff (M c , s) |= ϕ = 1, this clearly suffices to prove the result.
Let M c = (Σ c , K c 1 , ..., K c n , π c ), where
-consistent subset D 2 and for all p ∈ (Φ − Ψ), p = 1/2 ∈ V , and for all p ∈ Ψ, (p = 1/2) / ∈ V };
Note that, by Lemma B.4(2), the interpretation π c is well defined.
We want to show that
We show that (1) holds by induction on the structure of formulas. If ψ is a primitive proposition, this follows from the definition of π c (s V , ψ). If ψ = ¬ϕ or ψ = ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 or ψ = ϕ 1 ֒→ ϕ 2 , the argument is similar to that of Lemma B.5, we omit details here.
For the other direction, the argument is essentially identical to analogous arguments for Kripke structures. Suppose that (M c , s V ) |= (K i ϕ) = 1. It follows that the set (V /K i ) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} is not AX K,֒→ n -consistent. For suppose otherwise. By Lemma B.3, there would be a maximal AX K,֒→ n -consistent set W that contains (V /K i ) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} and, by construction, we would have s W ∈ K c i (s V ). By the induction hypothesis, (M c , s W ) |= (ϕ = 1), and so (M c , s W ) |= ϕ. Thus, (M c , s V ) |= K i ϕ, contradicting our assumption. Since (V /K i ) ∪ {¬(ϕ = 1)} is not AX K,֒→ n -consistent, there must be some finite subset, say {ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ k , ¬(ϕ = 1)}, which is not AX
n , as desired. To finish the proof that AX K,֒→ n is complete with respect to H − n (Φ), suppose that ϕ is valid in H − n (Φ). This implies that (ϕ = 0) ∨ (ϕ = 1/2) is not satisfiable, so by (1) We now want to show that there exist projection functions ρ c 
) But first we must show that this is well-defined; that is, that there exists a unique W with these properties. To this end, let R Ψ ′ ,Ψ be a binary relation on states in Σ c such that 
The following lemma proves existence.
Proof: Suppose that s V ∈ S c Ψ ′ . Let V Ψ be the subset of V containing all formulas of the form ϕ = 1, where ϕ contains only primitive propositions in Ψ. It is easily seen that V Ψ ∪ {p = 1/2 : p / ∈ Ψ} is AX K,֒→ n -consistent. For suppose, by way of contradiction, that it is not AX K,֒→ n -consistent. So, without loss of generality, there exists a formula ψ such that ψ = 1 ∈ V Ψ and AX K,֒→ n
, where p i = p j for i = j and p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ (Φ − Ψ). By Lemma C.2, it follows that H − n |= p 1 = 1/2 ֒→ (p 2 = 1/2 ֒→ (. . . ֒→ (p k = 1/2 ֒→ ¬(ψ = 1)))). It easily follows that H − n |= ¬(ψ = 1). Applying Lemma C.2 again, we get that AX K,֒→ n ⊢ ¬(ψ = 1). This is a contradiction, since ψ = 1 ∈ V and V is a maximal AX K,֒→ n -consistent subset of D 2 . It follows that V Ψ ∪ {p = 1/2 : p / ∈ Ψ} is contained in some maximal AX K,֒→ n -consistent subset W of D 2 . So s V and s W agrees on all formulas of the form ϕ = 1 for ϕ ∈ L K,֒→ n (Ψ) and therefore agree on all formulas in
The next lemma proves uniqueness.
Lemma C.4: If
Define a formula ψ to be simple if it is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form ϕ = k, where ϕ is implication-free. It is easy to check that if ϕ is implication-free, since s W ∈ S Ψ , then (M c , s W ) |= ϕ = 1/2 iff Φ ϕ − Ψ = ∅; the same is true for s W ′ . Moreover, if Φ ϕ ⊆ Ψ, then s W and s W ′ agree on ϕ. Thus, it easily follows that s W and s W ′ agree on all simple formulas. We show that W = W ′ by showing that every formula is equivalent to a simple formula; that is, for every formula ϕ ∈ D 2 , there exists a simple formula ϕ ′ such that H − n |= ϕ ⇀ ↽ ϕ ′ . First, we prove this for formulas ϕ of the form ψ = k, by induction on the structure of ψ. If ψ is a primitive proposition p, then ϕ is simple. The argument is straightforward, using the semantic definitions, if ψ is of the form ¬ψ ′ , ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , or ψ 1 ֒→ ψ 2 .
If ψ has the form K i ψ ′ , we proceed by cases. If k = 1/2, then the result follows immediately from the induction hypothesis, using the observation that H − n |= K i ψ ′ = 1/2 ⇀ ↽ ψ ′ = 1/2. To deal with the case k = 1, for Φ ′ ⊆ Φ ψ , define σ ψ,Φ ′ = p∈Φ ′ ((p ∨ ¬p) = 1) ∧ p∈(Φ ψ −Φ ′ ) p = 1/2. By the induction hypothesis, ψ ′ = 1 is equivalent to a simple formula ψ ′′ . Moreover, ψ ′′ is equivalent to Φ ′ ⊆Φ ψ (ψ ′′ ∧σ ψ,Φ ′ ). Finally, note that ψ ′′ ∧ σ ψ,Φ ′ is equivalent to a formula where each subformula ξ = k of ψ ′′ such that Φ ξ − Φ ′ = ∅ is replaced by ⊤ if k = 1/2 and replaced by ⊥ if k = 1/2; each subformula of the form ξ = 1/2 such that Φ ξ ⊆ Φ ′ is replaced by ⊥. Thus, ψ ′′ ∧ σ ψ,Φ ′ is equivalent to a formula of the form ψ Φ ′ ∧ σ ψ,Φ ′ , where ψ Φ ′ is simple, all of its primitive propositions are in Φ ′ , and all of its subformulas have the form ξ = 0 or ξ = 1. Let σ It easily follows that we have
It follows from confinedness that
Since H − n |= K i (ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ) ⇀ ↽ K i ψ 1 ∧ K i ψ 2 and H − n |= ξ = 1/2 ⇀ ↽ K i (ξ = 1/2), it follows that
Finally, since H − n |= K i (ξ = 1) ⇀ ↽ K i ξ = 1, we can conclude from (4), (5), and (6) that
and hence K i ψ ′ = 1 is equivalent to a simple formula. Since K i ψ = 0 is equivalent to ¬(K i ψ = 1) ∧ ¬(K i ψ = 1/2), and each of K i ψ = 1 and K i ψ = 1/2 is equivalent to a simple formula, it follows that K i ψ = 0 is equivalent to a simple formula.
The arguments that ¬ψ 1 , ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 , ψ 1 ֒→ ψ 2 , and K i ψ 1 are equivalent to simple formulas if ψ 1 and ψ 2 are follows similar lines, and is left to the reader. It follows that every formula in D 2 is equivalent to a simple formula. This shows that W = W ′ , as desired.
It follows from Lemmas C.3 and C.4 that R Ψ,Ψ ′ defines a function. We take this to be the definition of ρ c Ψ,Ψ ′ . We now must show that the projection functions are coherent. ⊢ ϕ ֒→ ϕ = 1, which by Gen, K ′ , Prop ′ , and MP ′ implies that AX K,֒→ n ⊢ (K i ϕ ֒→ K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1. Therefore, as (K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ V , by Lemma B.4(8,10), (K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V . By Prop ′ and Lemma B.4(3), it follows that K i (ϕ = 1) ∈ V . By T ′ and Lemma B.4(3), it follows that ϕ = 1 ∨ {p:p∈Φϕ} K i (p = 1/2) ∈ V . But since ϕ ∈ L K,֒→ n (Ψ 2 ), we must have Φ ϕ ⊆ Ψ 2 . Moreover, since K c i (s V ) ⊆ S c Ψ 2 , we must have ¬K i (p = 1/2) ∈ V for all p ∈ Ψ 2 . Thus, it easily follows that ϕ = 1 ∈ V . Finally, since s W = ρ c Ψ 1 ,Ψ 2 (s V ), we must have ϕ = 1 ∈ W , as desired. Now suppose 4 ′ ∈ C. We want to show that M c satisfies part (a) of stationarity. Suppose that s W ∈ K c i (s V ) and s X ∈ K c i (S W ). We must show that s X ∈ K c i (S V ). If (K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ V then, by axioms Prop ′ and 4 ′ and Lemma B.4(3), (K i K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ V . This implies that (K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ W , which implies that ϕ = 1 ∈ X. Thus, V /K i ⊆ X and s X ∈ K c i (s V ), as desired. Finally, suppose that 5 ′ ∈ C. We want to show that M c satisfies part (b) of stationarity. Suppose that s W ∈ K c i (s V ) and s X ∈ K c i (s V ). We must show that s X ∈ K c i (s W ). Suppose by way of contradiction that s X / ∈ K c i (s W ), then there exists ϕ = 1 ∈ W/K i such that ϕ = 1 / ∈ X. ϕ = 1 ∈ W/K i implies that (K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ W , so by Prop ′ , B1, and Lemma B.4(3) it follows that ϕ = 1/2 / ∈ W . By Conf2 it can be easily shown that ϕ = 1/2 / ∈ X, so by Prop ′ , we get that ϕ = 0 ∈ X. As in the proof of the case T ′ ∈ C, if (K i ϕ) = 1 ∈ W , then (K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ W . Then it follows that (K i ¬K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 / ∈ V , for otherwise since s W ∈ K c i (s V ) we get that (¬K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ W . Since (K i ¬K i (ϕ = 1)) ∈ D 2 , it is easy to show that (¬K i ¬K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V . By Prop ′ and 5 ′ and Lemma B.4(8,10), it follows that (K i (ϕ = 1) ∨ K i ((ϕ = 1) = 1/2)) = 1 ∈ V . Then using Lemma B.4(5,6,7), it easily follows that either (K i (ϕ = 1)) = 1 ∈ V or (K i ((ϕ = 1) = 1/2)) = 1 ∈ V . Then, either (ϕ = 1) = 1 ∈ X or ((ϕ = 1) = 1/2) = 1 ∈ X, but this is a contradiction since ϕ = 0 ∈ X and X is AX K,֒→ n -consistent.
